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This paper is based upon remarks prepared for the Special Meeting on
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Jerry O'Driscoll provided helpful suggestions. However, neither they,
the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, nor the Federal Reserve System
necessarily share the views expressed herein.INTRODUCTI ON
Monetary policy rules of the type proposed by McCallum (1988)
specify a target and an instrument. The monetary authority adjusts the
instrument-'inresponse -to -deviations -of ·the target variable from its
desired path. The instrument must be under the tight control of
policymakers and must be predictably related to the target. The target
must be readily observable and reliably linked to some measure or
measures of economic well-being. In a recent paper, Judd and Motley
(1992) consider two alternative target variables--nominal gross
domestic product (nominal GDP) and nominal M2--and two alternative
instruments--the monetary base and the federal funds rate. Other
papers, by Bennett McCallum (1990) and Judd and Motley (1991), have
compared the performance of rules based on nominal-GDP targets to the
performance of rules based on price-level targets. I will begin with
some comments on issues that arise out of this earlier literature.
Later, I will discuss the appropriate strategy for choosing a policy
instrument and the potential role of M2 in the policy-making process.
PRICE-LEVEL STABILITY OR ZERO INFLATION?
Changes in the rate of money growth do not appear to have
important long-run effects on the path of real output. Whether one
wants to include a measure of real output as a target variable
governing the direction of monetary policy, then, depends upon whether
or not one believes changes in the money supply have a significant
near-term impact on economic activity. Those who believe that the
•near-term impact of money-supply changes is negligible-or who, like
Barro (1986), believe that money-supply changes affect real activity
only by interfering with the smooth working of the private
economy4ypicllllyfavor aprtce-leve1 target. On the other hand, those
who take traditional Keynesian models seriously tend to favor a nominal
income target. Nominal-income targeting attaches equal weights to the
price level and real output as guides to the direction of monetary
policy. Simulations suggest that policy rules that target nominal
income stabilize inflation nearly as well as rules that target the
price level directly. Further, if the economy.is assumed to be
Keynesian, nominal-income targeting yields a smoother path of real
output than does price-level targeting.
Stabilizing inflation is not the same thing as stabilizing the
price level, and the desirability of nominal-income targeting has been
questioned on the grounds that if real output is not trend-stationary,
then targeting a deterministic path for nominal GDP will give rise to a
non-stationary price level (Haraf 1986).
I think that nominal-income targeting may be preferable to
price-level targeting, even in a world where wages and prices are
completely flexible-so that the usual motivation for a Keynesian
analysis is missing-and even in a world where output is subject to
permanent supply-side shocks-so that nominal-income targeting yields a
non-stationary price level. Briefly, my argument is that price-level
targeting substantially increases the vulnerability of a real-business-
cycle world to the disruptive effects of financial crises.
-3-For concreteness, suppose that the full-employment level of
output falls by one-third. Assuming no Keynesian wage or price
rigidities, the usual story would be that actual output also falls by
one-third, 4ndependent of any action that the monetary authority might
or might not take. If the monetary authority chooses to maintain a
constant price level, nominal income declines by one-third, matching
the decline in output.
Consider the impact of these events on borrowers and lenders.
Lenders are completely insulated from the output shock, in the sense
that the real value of payments on existing loans is entirely
unaffected, so that a household deriving all of its income from
interest would not see any change in its standard of living. For
borrowers, the situation is quite different. The nominal and, hence,
the real value of home-mortgage, auto-loan, credit-card, and other
obligations is unchanged. Borrowers' discretionary incomes-the incomes
they have available to purchase current output-must, therefore, absorb
the full force of the declines in borrowers' gross incomes. For
example, a household that had been devoting 50% of its gross income to
fixed obligations would see its discretionary income fall to only one-
third of its pre-shock level. A sufficiently large adverse supply
shock could easily drive the discretionary income of some borrowers to
zero. In any case, if aggregate income falls by one-third, but
lenders' living standards are unchanged, then the living standards of
borrowers must fall by more than one-third.
In much the same way, the real-income gains resulting from a
-4-positive supply shock accrue only to borrowers. In general, borrowers
bear all the risk related to supply shocks. Lenders bear none of the
risk.
'While, in-theory, -it ought to be possible to reallocate risk by
making debt contracts contingent upon aggregate supply shocks, such
contingencies are rarely observed in practice. Typically, borrowers
are offered concessions only if they are facing severe financial
distress. Then, loan payments are merely rescheduled, not forgiven.
Even rescheduling is difficult to arrange when multiple lenders are
involved. In any case, one benefit of price-level stability is
supposed to be a simplification of debt contracts. If under a price-
level-stabilization rule debts must be indexed to real output, this
purpose has been defeated.
As a practical matter, then, adverse supply shocks are likely to
hit borrowers disproportionately hard under a price-level-stabilization
rule. Aseries of adverse shocks might well drive borrowers into
default, threatening the solvency of financial intermediaries and, so,
disrupting capital formation and production. Such disruptions are more
likely the larger and more highly autocorrelated are deviations of
potential output away from trend. So, it is precisely in a real-
business-cycle world-where supply shocks are large and have a
substantial permanent component-that the negative side effects of price
stability are the greatest threat.
In general, an adverse supply shock has much the same effect on
the financial health of an economy with a stable price level as a
-5-comparably sized deflation has on the financial health of an economy
with a constant level of potential output.
Under nominal-income targeting-unlike price-level targeting-the
real impact ~f supply shocks·-i-s distributed evenly between borrowers
and lenders. A one-third decline in potential real GOP is accompanied
by a one-third increase in the price level. Consequently, the real
value of debt obligations and interest payments also declines by one-
third. Borrowers are less likely to be pushed into default than under
a price-level-stabilization rule, and the financial system is less
likely to undergo stress.
Aminor variation on nominal-income targeting-nominal-
consumption targeting-has a nice intuitive rationale. If utility is
logarithmic in consumption, then holding the nominal value of
consumption constant is equivalent to holding the marginal-utility
value of money constant,' This definition of price-level stability is
more appealing than the conventional definition, which holds constant
the value of money measured in units of output.
Interestingly, the consumption-capital-asset-pricing model
(consumption-CAPM) suggests that nominal interest rates would be
constant if nominal-consumption targeting were successfully
1. The marginal-utility value of money is u'(c)/p, where c is consumption,
p is the price level, and u(o) is the utility function. Assuming logarithmic
utility, u'(c)/p = l/(poc).
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implemented. 2 Empirically, the consumption-CAPM seems to perform
better at intermediate and long time horizons than at short time
horizons, so we could probably expect a nominal-consumption-targeting
rule to stabilize -intermediate"term and -long-term interest rates more
than short-term rates.
To recap, one doesn't have to believe that output is trend-
stationary or that prices are sticky in order to believe that some
variant of nominal-income targeting is desirable. Even if most
recessions have their roots in supply-side shocks, the actions of the
Federal Reserve influence how such shocks are propagated through the
financial markets and, so, help determine whether the real impact of
the shocks is amplified by the disruption of credit relationships.
Financial crises have historically been an important contributing
factor to the most severe of our economic downturns, and the
elimination of these crises was one of the principal motivations for
establishing the Federal Reserve System.
2. According to the consumption-CAPM, the utility derived from spending a
dollar today must equal the expected utility derived from saving that dollar
and spending the proceeds tomorrow. Thus,
u'(c(t))/p(t) = E[u'(c(t+1))/p(t+1))(1 + R(t))/(l + p),
where R(t) is the nominal interest rate and p is the rate of time preference.
With logarithmic utility, this condition becomes
1 + R(t) = (1 + p)/E[p(t)c(t)/{p(t+1)c{t+1))).
So, R(t) = p if people expect the ratio of current spending to future spending
to equal unity, and, more generally, the nominal interest rate is constant if
people expect the ratio of current consumption spending to future consumption
spending to be held fixed.
-7-INSTRUMENTS AND INDICATORS
We have seen that, in selecting a target variable, one should
use an analytical framework that distinguishes between borrowers and
lenders. Likewise, in-comparing the performance of various instruments
it is essential that one distinguish between inside money and outside
money, between currency and reserves, between periods of regulated and
periods of deregulated deposit interest rates, and between long-term
and short-term interest rates.
Adistinction between currency and bank reserves is made
necessary by the Federal Reserve's commitment to provide currency on
demand. As Hafer, Haslag, and Hein (1992) have pointed out, when
combined with a feedback rule for the monetary base, the Federal
Reserve's commitment to providing currency on demand can lead to a
squeeze on bank reserves. If banks face a binding ceiling on deposit
interest rates, any squeeze on their reserves would force a sharp
curtailment in lending. Without a ceiling, deposit interest rates
would rise, putting upward pressure on the general level of rates.
These effects can only be satisfactorily analyzed using a model that
includes both inside and outside money and that allows, historically,
for a binding Regulation Q.
Long-term interest rates affect investment, short-term interest
rates are the rates most directly subject to Federal Reserve control,
and the spread between short-term and long-term rates is closely
related to the opportunity cost of holding inside money. Consequently,






real and financial sectors-or to say anything convincing about the
merits of one policy instrument compared with another-without carefully
modeling the relationship between long-term and short-term interest
rates. Among ~ther things," this means recognizing that long-term rates
are a weighted average of current and expected future short-term rates.
If one models long-term rates as a weighted average of current and past
short rates, one is leaving oneself open to the Lucas critique.
Before concluding, I will touch upon the potential usefulness of
M2 as a target for monetary policy. A case for M2-targeting can be
based upon M2's historical tendency to lead movements in income and
upon M2's availability on a monthly (even weekly), rather than
quarterly, basis. Recent analyses capture the first of these
considerations but ignore the second. 3 My own suspicion is that M2 is
probably best viewed as an indicator variable or supplementary target
variable rather than as a replacement for nominal income in the policy
rule. As an indicator or supplementary target, information on M2 could
help gUide adjustments in the Federal Reserve's chosen policy
instrument between quarterly GDP reports. In view of the recent
deterioration in standard models' ability to explain its movements,
however, caution is required before giving M2 even this limited role.
3. See McCallum (1990) and Judd and Motley (1992).
-9-CONCLUSION
The idea of an explicit policy rule is appealing. The case for
some variant of nominal-income targeting is stronger than has generally
been recognized'. Until we improve our"understandingof the linkages
between the real and financial sectors, however, we cannot with any
confidence say which of its potential instruments the Federal Reserve
should use to keep nominal spending on course. Nor can we with any
confidence say what the feedback mechanism linking instrument to target
should be. To ask highly stylized macroeconomic models to shed light
on the relative merits of alternative instruments and feedback rules,
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